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Registered nurses (RNs) have become attracted to union representa-
tion in recent years, and by 2003, 16.9 percent were union members (in 
contrast to 15.6 percent in 1985). Licensed practical nurses (LPNs) had 
a 10.8 percent unionization rate in that same year. Health care is clearly 
a major arena in which many professionals and technicians are now 
attempting to organize.1 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) ex-
plicitly defines professionals as employees and grants them organizing 
and collective bargaining rights. The Supreme Court, however, has in-
terpreted U.S. labor law in a way that puts barriers in the path of health 
care professionals who seek to join unions.2 
Supervisory employees are excluded from coverage in the statute 
itself, and managerial employees have been excluded by judicial in-
terpretation of the act. On the other hand, professionals often act in a 
supervisory or managerial capacity at times, insofar as they direct the 
work of less-skilled employees (e.g., nurses often direct nursing assis-
tants). Thus, the NLRB and the courts have struggled with where to 
draw the line with regard to which professionals are employees whose 
rights to organize are protected by the law. In the last 10 years, the 
Supreme Court has reduced the number of health care professionals 
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who have such protection in two decisions, NLRB v. Kentucky River 
Community Care, 532 U.S. 706 (2001) and NLRB v. Health Care and 
Retirement Corp. of America, 511 U.S. 571 (1994). Both decisions find 
certain groups of nurses to be supervisors and hence not employees 
with protected organizing rights. While these decisions were widely de-
cried by the labor movement and clearly had an impact on the nurses 
in the two facilities concerned, their wider impact is less certain. In this 
chapter, we assess the effect of the more recent Kentucky River decision 
on organizing, with a primary focus on nurses and related health care 
professionals. We look at two different types of evidence: interviews 
with union organizers and attorneys and post–Kentucky River legal de-
cisions.
THE DEFINITION OF SUPERVISORS ACCORDING TO THE 
NLRA AND THE SUPREME COURT 
While the NLRA provides certain protections to workers (e.g., the 
right to join unions, the right to strike), those protections only apply to 
“employees,” as defined by Section 2(3) of the act. According to that 
section, “The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee . . . but shall 
not include . . . any individual employed as a supervisor (29 U.S.C. 
§152(3) (2001).” Thus, an individual employed as a “supervisor” as 
defined in section 2(11) is not considered an employee and is therefore 
not entitled to the act’s protections. However, professional employees 
are expressly included as employees in section 2(12).3
The terms employee, supervisor, and professional employee are de-
fined by the text of the NLRA itself, but the Supreme Court has fur-
ther defined their meanings in a number of decisions, two of which 
have been especially important in the field of health care. The first was 
NLRB v. Health Care and Retirement Corp. of America, a case that be-
gan with employer discipline of four LPNs in the context of an organiz-
ing drive. In response, the LPNs filed unfair labor practice charges with 
the NLRB.
Initially, the administrative law judge (ALJ) and the board had found 
that the nurses were not supervisors (Health Care and Retirement Corp. 
of America, 306 NLRB 63, 1992). In reaching that conclusion, the ALJ 
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and the board relied on “patient care analysis” (see Keller [1996] and 
Straight [1999] for a fuller discussion). To be considered a supervisor 
under section 2(11) of the act, a person has to exercise 1 of the 12 super-
visory functions in the interests of the employer.4 Patient care analysis 
drew a distinction between “the interests of the employer” and “the in-
terests of the patient.” According to patient care analysis, when a nurse 
utilized independent judgment in connection with his (her) professional 
judgment, (s)he would be considered a professional employee and not 
a supervisor. In applying that analysis, the ALJ held that the four LPNs 
were entitled to protection under the NLRA because their work did “not 
equate to ‘responsibly . . . directing’ the aides in the interest of the 
employer” and that “the nurses’ focus [was] on the well-being of the 
residents rather than [that] of the employer” (306 NLRB at 70).
In its 5–4 decision upholding the Sixth Circuit Court’s reversal of 
the board and determining that the LPNs were supervisors, the Supreme 
Court noted that there is a three-part test for determining whether indi-
viduals are supervisors: Individuals are deemed to be “supervisors” if 
1) they hold the authority to exercise 1 of the 12 supervisory functions 
listed in section 2(11); 2) their exercise of such authority is not of a 
merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent 
judgment; and 3) their authority is held “in the interest of the employ-
er.” Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concluded 
that the board impermissibly distorted the statutory language in trying 
to distinguish between “the interest of patients” and “the interest of the 
employer.” Kennedy stated
 . . . the Board has created a false dichotomy—in this case, a di-
chotomy between acts taken in connection with patient care and 
acts taken in the interest of the employer. That dichotomy makes 
no sense. Patient care is the business of a nursing home, and it fol-
lows that attending to the needs of the nursing home patients, who 
are the employer’s customers, is in the interest of the employer. 
(511 U.S. at 577)
The second case in which the Supreme Court held that nurses were 
supervisors and therefore not entitled to the NLRA’s protections was 
NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care Inc., et al. In Kentucky River, 
the Kentucky State District Council of Carpenters petitioned the NLRB 
in 1997 to represent a unit of professional and nonprofessional employ-
ees. The employer objected to the inclusion of six registered nurses in 
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the bargaining unit, arguing that they were supervisors under the act. 
The regional director found that the employer had not carried its burden 
of proof demonstrating that the nurses were supervisors—hence, he in-
cluded them in the bargaining unit. The union won the election and was 
certified as the employees’ bargaining representative.
The board held that the nurses involved were employees and not 
supervisors because they did not exercise “independent judgment.” In 
its brief before the Supreme Court, the board stated 
[t]he National Labor Relations Board has long held that an employ-
ee does not exercise “independent judgment” that triggers super-
visory status under Section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations 
Act when he uses ordinary professional or technical judgment in 
directing less-skilled employees to deliver services in accordance 
with employer-specified standards. That interpretation, which the 
Board has applied to a variety of industries and employees, is en-
titled to deference because it is rational and consistent with the 
Act. (Citations omitted; NLRB brief to Supreme Court at 11.)
In other words, the board made a distinction between independent 
judgment, which the board found as warranting supervisor status, and 
ordinary professional or technical judgment in accordance with employ-
er specified standards, which the board found to be not supervisory.
The Supreme Court, however, in another 5–4 decision, affirmed an-
other Sixth Circuit reversal of the NLRB. Justice Antonin Scalia, writ-
ing for the majority, found the board’s distinction to be without basis 
in law.
The Board, however, argues further that the judgment even of em-
ployees who are permitted by their employer to exercise a suf-
ficient degree of discretion is not “independent judgment” if it is 
a particular kind of judgment, namely, “ordinary professional or 
technical judgment in directing less-skilled employees to deliver 
services.” (Brief for Petitioner 11.) The first five words of this in-
terpretation insert a startling categorical exclusion into statutory 
text that does not suggest its existence. The text, by focusing on 
the “clerical” or “routine” (as opposed to “independent”) nature of 
the judgment, introduces the question of degree of judgment that 
we have agreed falls within the reasonable discretion of the Board 
to resolve. But the Board’s categorical exclusion turns on factors 
that have nothing to do with the degree of discretion an employee 
exercises. (532 U.S. at 714)
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Acknowledging that the board has the discretion to determine the 
degree to which an employee’s exercise of judgment places her within 
the exemption, Scalia nonetheless pointed out that the text of section 
2(11) focuses on the clerical or routine nature of the judgment, not 
whether it is professional or technical. “What supervisory judgment 
worth exercising, one must wonder, does not rest on professional or 
technical skill or experience?” he asked (532 U.S. at 714). These two 
cases, combined with the ongoing reorganization of nursing work to 
include more supervisory duties in the job of the typical nurse, raise 
questions about whether or not nurses will be able to avail themselves 
of their rights granted by the NLRA. 
OPINIONS OF UNION ORGANIZERS, ORGANIZING 
DIRECTORS, AND UNION LEGAL COUNSEL 
We began to investigate the impact of Kentucky River by interview-
ing practitioners who are in a position to evaluate what effects, if any, 
the ruling is having on nurse organizing. We talked to union staff in-
volved in organizing or supporting organizing from groups that repre-
sent nurses in two states and one metropolitan area: California, Illinois, 
and greater New York City. The purpose was not to do a statistically 
valid survey but rather to explore what effects, if any, Kentucky River 
may be having “on the ground” in three major geographic areas that 
have seen a great deal of interest in representation among nurses. 
We talked to eight individuals in the following organizations: Unit-
ed American Nurses, California Nurses Association, New York State 
Nurses Association, Illinois Nurses Association, Health Professionals 
and Allied Employees/AFT and the Service Employees (the interna-
tional and two of its California locals); we also received a brief e-mail 
response from the Steelworkers, who stated that they were organizing 
nurses primarily in other states. The specific questions we posed varied 
somewhat depending on the main responsibility of the individual to 
whom we were speaking, but questions focused primarily on whether or 
not the union had seen an increase or decrease of interest in organizing 
among nurses in the 18 months following the Kentucky River decision, 
whether or not the union had witnessed a change in employer tactics as 
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a result of the decision, whether or not the union had changed what it 
was doing to organize in light of the decision, and whether or not the 
union was involved in litigation as a result of Kentucky River.5 
Most union staff stated they had not see any diminution of interest 
in representation on the part of nurses. Some claimed that, if anything, 
interest in unionization has increased, as a result of the workload pres-
sures on nurses occasioned by the shortage of nurses and continued 
cost-cutting by hospitals affecting staffing levels.6 Others argued that, 
although Kentucky River appears to have had little impact on interest 
in organizing among nurses, there has been some diminution of interest 
in the recent period due to the increased individual bargaining power 
of nurses stemming from the nursing shortage, the efforts of hospitals 
to avoid unionization by granting large increases in wages and ben-
efits, and the rise of opportunities to work desired hours as an agency 
nurse.7
No organization has changed the groups that it was targeting for or-
ganizing as a result of the Kentucky River decision; organizations were 
not shifting organizing resources from the private to the public sec-
tor, from one type of health care worker to another, or from one type 
of health care provider (acute care, long-term care, etc.) to another. In 
at least one case, this was because a sector was already union-satu-
rated (the public sector in the New York City metropolitan region), so 
sectoral shifts were not possible. Interestingly, in this case, the earlier 
Health Care Retirement decision had caused a shift away from organiz-
ing RNs in nursing homes and toward nurses in hospitals; Kentucky 
River, however, has made little difference.8
Naturally, all the union staff saw the Kentucky River decision as 
problematic, but its effects on employer tactics, on union tactics, and 
on the ultimate ability of nurses to organize were seen as being incre-
mentally negative rather than as disastrous. Several staff pointed out 
that employers began contending that nurses are supervisors well be-
fore the decision. Kentucky River deepened the problem but did not 
fundamentally change the situation. A number of organizers did report, 
however, that Kentucky River has lengthened delays in elections and/or 
first contract bargaining. This is potentially a serious problem in that 
election delays have long been associated with union losses (Roomkin 
and Block 1981).
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Some organizers reported that Kentucky River has lengthened 
delays because it has increased the ability of hospitals to challenge 
bargaining units before the election on the grounds that charge nurses 
are really supervisors. New York State Nurses Association organizer 
John O’Conner spoke of two hospitals in the New York City area 
that have done this and said, “I believe the employer, in both cases, 
used the supervisory status as a stall-tactic based on the Kentucky 
River decision.” SEIU Associate General Counsel Diana Ceresi also 
emphasized the problems that were being caused by uncertainty over 
whether or not individuals would be considered supervisors and the 
accompanying delay:
Nurses are organizing because of real concerns about their working 
conditions—systematic understaffing resulting in forced overtime, 
floating out of specialty areas and lack of adequate time for indi-
vidual patients. Instead of welcoming nurse input, some employers 
go to great lengths to instill fear and fight the nurses’ organizing 
efforts. In one case, they have gone so far as to claim that every 
nurse in a hospital is a supervisor . . . Even if the argument is a 
losing one in the end for the employer, hashing out the supervisory 
questions through the various levels of appeal results in months if 
not years of delay before nurses can even get to the table to negoti-
ate for simple workplace changes.
As suggested by this quote, the delay can come after a successful 
representation election but before bargaining. Nicole Fefferman, a staff 
organizer for SEIU Local 121 in Los Angeles, cited the situation at one 
employer subsequent to the decision. This employer refused to come 
to the bargaining table for a unit that contained charge nurses, even 
though the NLRB earlier had found them to be eligible to vote in an 
election when the employer challenged their eligibility at that time. The 
uncertain legal situation, in her opinion, was adding to the delay. This 
view was echoed by Beth Kean of the California Nurses Association, 
who stated, “If unions get caught up in the Kentucky River legal trap, 
union recognition and first contracts could be delayed for many, many 
years, with the continued uncertainty during that time about charge 
nurse/team leader eligibility and even whether or not recognition will 
ever happen at all.”
Unions are finding ways to cope with this difficult environment, 
however. Several organizations told us that they were responding by 
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applying community pressure on the employers involved. For instance, 
the CNA said that it was getting groups of charge nurses who want 
union representation to step down from their charge positions into regu-
lar staff positions before the eligibility cutoff date to ensure their eligi-
bility. This happened, for example, at St. Joseph’s Hospital in Eureka, 
California, where a 300-RN unit refused the extra pay and responsi-
bilities of the charge nurse position. Kean claimed that, after this, an-
other hospital in the same chain did not challenge the charge nurse/team 
leader union eligibility at all, apparently deciding that it did not want 
to receive the bad publicity accompanying the Eureka job action. Simi-
larly, Andrew Strom, Associate General Counsel for the SEIU in Los 
Angeles, stated that, in at least one case, his organization attempted 
to mount community pressure rather than turn to litigation as a way to 
counteract employer claims that charge nurses were supervisors. John 
O’Connor of the New York State Nurses Association talked about a cur-
rent campaign where the health care agency had claimed many nurses 
to be supervisors:
Our strategy will be to apply community pressure on the employer. 
We plan to picket the hospital board members’ businesses and we 
have obtained the support and participation from other community 
organizations . . . We plan to use the militancy of the nurses to get 
what they want. In addition, we plan to educate the nurses on their 
collective bargaining power in the workplace.
It would appear that Kentucky River is reinforcing a tendency 
among labor organizations to utilize community organizing strategies 
and membership-mobilization in order to counteract the general prob-
lems occasioned by the current legal process for representation.
Attorney Andrew Strom, of the SEIU in Los Angeles, pointed out 
that the Kentucky River decision is having ramifications for other types 
of workers besides nurses:
The issue goes beyond the nurses and hospitals. We have a group 
of security officers who are organizing. Every building has a lead 
person. The existence of a lead person could cause the employer to 
push the issue of supervisory status. I don’t think it was the inten-
tion of the act to turn ‘lead’ people into supervisors.
It is interesting to note that Strom’s opinion is borne out by the case 
analysis that we conducted for this study, which demonstrates as much 
impact of Kentucky River outside health care as within that sector.
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IMPACT OF KENTUCKY RIVER ON SUBSEQUENT  
LEGAL DECISIONS
We assessed the importance of Kentucky River on subsequent legal 
decisions by reading every opinion that mentioned the case after the Su-
preme Court’s decision and evaluating the extent to which the Court’s 
decision in Kentucky River influenced the outcome. We used Lexis to 
locate all cases that mentioned Kentucky River for the period from the 
decision until November 1, 2004. Our goal was not to do a statistical 
analysis of cases but rather to gain an understanding of how Kentucky 
River is affecting subsequent decisions by the NLRB and the courts. 
We also were interested in determining whether or not the effects of 
Kentucky River are being felt in other industries besides health care and 
by other occupational groups besides nurses. 
Court of Appeals Cases
According to Lexis, Kentucky River has been cited in 14 court of 
appeals decisions and in a 15th case by the dissenting judge. Table 7.1 
lists all 15 decisions. According to our reading of these decisions, the 
Supreme Court’s opinion does seem to be of some import at the circuit 
court level. While it is too early to determine with certainty just how 
much the case has mattered, it is clear that Kentucky River is influenc-
ing the decisions of the circuit courts. Two of the 14 decisions in which 
Kentucky River was cited involved health care. In both, the NLRB had 
found certain nursing professionals to be employees protected by the 
act but the court reversed and remanded the cases back to the board 
to reconsider its decision in light of Kentucky River. One recent deci-
sion involving a health care facility was rendered in Evergreen New 
Hope Health & Rehab. Ctr. v. NLRB, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10644 
(9th Cir. May 27, 2003), a case that has been very heavily influenced by 
Kentucky River throughout. An election was held in a bargaining unit 
that included “[a]ll full-time and regular part-time licensed vocational 
nurses, nurses aides, certified nursing assistants” and a small number of 
registered nurses. Since the regional director had found that to be an ap-
propriate unit prior to Kentucky River, the board, in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision, granted the employer’s request for review. Following 
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Industry; employees Effect of Kentucky River (KR)
Circuit court cases
Albertson’s v. NLRB, 301 F. 3d 441 (6th Cir. 2002) Grocery; n/a None. Procedural citation.
Beverly Enterprises-Minnesota, Inc. v. NLRB,  
266 F 3d 785 (8th Cir. 2003)
Health care (nursing home); 
RN/LPN
Some. Remanded to NLRB.
Brusco Tug & Barge v. NLRB, 247 F 3d 273 
 (DC Cir. 2091)
Inland shipping; mates None.
Coastal Lumber v NLRB, 117 L.R.R.M 3215  
(4th Cir. 2001)
Lumber; n/a Some. Remanded to NLRB.
Coursen v. United States Postal Serv., 256 F. 3d 1353 
(Fed. Cir. 2001)
Postal service; postal worker None.
Entergy Gulf States v. NLRB, 253 F. 3d 303  
(5th Cir. 2001)
Elec. power; operations 
coordinator
Probably none. Reversed NLRB but KR 
not important.
Evergreen New Hope Health & Rehab. Cr., 2003 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 10644 (9th Cir. 2003)
Health care; charge nurses Matters. Court reversed NLRB citing KR.
Multimedia KSDK, Inc. v. NLRB, 271 F.3d 744  
(8th Cir. 2002)
Television; editors/producers None.
NLRB v. Dole Fresh Vegetables, 2003 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 10788 (6th Cir. 2003)
Vegetable packing; 
maintenance leads
None. Cited on burden of proof.
NLRB v. Interstate Builders, 351 F. 3d 1020 
 (10th Cir. 2003)
Iron works; n/a None. Cited on procedural issue on 
dissent.
NLRB v. Quinnipiac College, 256 F 3d 68  
(2nd Cir. 2001)
College; sec. officers and 
shift supervisors
Probably none. Reversed NLRB but KR 
not important.
Nathan Katz Realty LLC v. NLRB, 251 F 3d 981  
(DC Cir. 2001)
Real Estate; apartment 
supervisors
None. Cited on burden of proof.
Table 7.1  Appellate Court Cases Referring to Kentucky River
Suprem
e C
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Public Service Co. v. NLRB, 271 F.3d 1213 
(10th Cir. 2001)
Utility; transmission workers Matters. Refused to enforce bargaining 
order. Because of KR; remanded to NLRB.
Webco Industries, Inc. v. NLRB 90 Fed. Appx. 276  
(10th Cir. 2003)
Steel manufacturing; trainer None. Cited on burden of proof.
Westchester Iron Works v. NLRB, 2002 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 20755 (DC Cir. 2002)
Iron works; n/a None.
California appellate court case
Rodney Lee Roth et al., Bice, et al.2002 Cal. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 3368
Construction; foremen None. Would have been supervisor prior 
to KR.
Arizona court of appeals
Smith v. Cigna Health Plan of Arizona, 2002 Ariz. 
App. LEXIS 120
Health care; chief of staff 
(MD)
None. Clearly supervisory before KR.
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a hearing on remand, the regional director issued a supplemental deci-
sion and direction of election in which he, applying Kentucky River, 
reaffirmed his finding that the employer had failed to establish that its 
registered nurses were statutory supervisors. On September 21, 2001, 
the board denied the employer’s request for review of this supplemental 
decision. When the 9th Circuit heard the case, however, it reversed the 
decision and remanded the case to the regional director, ordering him 
to review his finding on the supervisory status of the registered nurses, 
stating:
That these decisions rely on the charge nurses’ professional train-
ing and experience does not mean that it is not also an exercise 
of independent judgment . . . There is substantial evidence in the 
record that the charge nurses exercise independent judgment and 
that they are ‘responsibly to direct’ the other employees. There 
is not substantial evidence in the record to support the regional 
director’s conclusion that the charge nurses are not ‘supervisors’ 
as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10655 
at p. 5) (citations omitted) 
Similarly, in Beverly Enterprises-Minnesota, Inc. v. NLRB, 266 F.3d 
785, (8th Cir. 2001) the 8th Circuit remanded the case to the board for 
reconsideration in light of Kentucky River. This case became one of the 
three lead cases designated for decision by the board in July, 2003, and 
has yet to be determined by the board on remand. It will be discussed 
further below.
Kentucky River also has had an impact on court of appeals decisions 
outside of health care. In two cases at this level, the courts specifically 
relied on Kentucky River in reversing an NLRB decision. The clearest 
negative outcome for employee rights came in Public Service Company 
of Colorado v. NLRB, 271 F. 3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2001), a case in which 
the 10th Circuit Court refused to enforce the board’s bargaining order 
or even remand the case:
[The Board’s] decision specifically traces the standard that it ap-
plies to the line of charge nurse cases overturned by Kentucky River. 
Rather the finding was by necessity based on the very categorical 
distinction struck down by the Supreme Court. Hence the Board’s 
erroneous interpretation of “independent judgment” precludes us 
from enforcing its order in this case. Accordingly we reverse the 
Board’s entry of summary judgment, vacate its bargaining order di-
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recting the Company to negotiate with a Union bargaining unit that 
includes the transmission employees, and deny enforcement. The 
Board’s request for remand is also denied. (271 F/ 3d., p. 1218)
Similarly, in Coastal Lumber v. NLRB, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 
23424; 24 Fed. Appx. 120 (4th Cir. 2001), the NLRB had certified a 
bargaining unit in 2001, but the employer appealed to the 4th Circuit, 
contending that six employees in the unit were supervisors and there-
fore not entitled to organize and bargain collectively. The board cross-
petitioned for enforcement of its order. The Circuit Court remanded 
the case to the board for reconsideration in light of Kentucky River, 
“[b]ecause the decision in this case can be read to have been premised 
in part on an incorrect legal standard” (24 Fed. Appx., p. 121). Here 
again, Kentucky River was the basis for a court of appeals’ refusal to en-
force a bargaining order.9 In this case however, the remand to the board 
may or may not result in an ultimate change in the board’s decision as 
to the supervisory status of the employees.
In the remaining court of appeals decisions, the courts cite Kentucky 
River in a routine way, as the Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement on 
supervisory status. The outcomes in these cases do not appear to turn on 
Kentucky River, however. 
NLRB Cases
In examining the impact of Kentucky River at the NLRB level, we 
divide our discussion into two periods. On July 24, 2003, the NLRB 
invited the parties and interested amici to file briefs addressing supervi-
sory issues in light of the Kentucky River decision for three lead cases: 
Oakwood Healthcare, Beverly Enterprises–Minnesota, d/b/a Golden 
Crest Healthcare Center, and Croft Metals. This announcement sig-
naled a decision by an NLRB increasingly dominated by appointees 
of President Bush, as opposed to those appointed by President Clinton, 
to reexamine its approach to the entire question of supervisory status. 
While the NLRB has not issued a decision or ruling in these three lead 
cases upon completion of this chapter in late 2004, its general coun-
sel, Arthur F. Rosenfeld, filed an amicus brief on September 18, 2004 
and the perspective espoused in this brief may well be adopted by the 
NLRB, in whole or in part. Since the board’s notice in July 2003 may 
well indicate a shift in its views, we discuss this brief and the few cases 
176  Abraham, Eaton, and Voos
in the area decided by the board after July 2003, separately from our 
discussion of its position up to July 24, 2003.
Cases prior to July 24, 2003
According to LEXIS, Kentucky River was cited in 39 NLRB deci-
sions prior to July 24, 2003.10 Table 7.2 contains the cases for this peri-
od. Ten of the cases involve the health care industry, broadly construed 
to include hospitals, long-term care facilities/nursing homes, medical 
clinics, group homes, and home health care workers. In most of these 
cases, the supervisory status of nurses is at issue, although two involve 
doctors and one involves the program managers of group homes for the 
developmentally disabled. Further, outside health care, there are some 
major industrial/occupational groupings that have been analyzed under 
the rationale announced in Kentucky River: a number of cases involve 
mates, pilots, and captains in boats/casinos operating in inland water-
ways, and another group involves coordinators for electric utilities. We 
divide our discussion by industry beginning with health care.
Throughout this period, the board generally continued to classify 
nurses as employees rather than supervisors despite Kentucky River, 
even in cases that had been remanded to the board after the Supreme 
Court decision. The board reached this conclusion by focusing on the 
nonindependent nature of the nurses’ decisions, rather than on their pro-
fessional nature—and in nursing, direction of nurses’ aides and other 
employees is often carried out in accord with detailed guidelines es-
tablished by the employer. For example, Nurses United for Improved 
Patient Healthcare, 2002 NLRB LEXIS 319 (2002), dealt with a clini-
cal coordinator’s eligibility for inclusion in a bargaining unit over the 
employer’s contention that she was a supervisor. Despite Kentucky 
River, the ALJ found her to be an employee, stating: “The degree of 
discretion which O’Roark exercises is simply too minimal for her to be 
considered a supervisor” (2002 NLRB LEXIS 319 at p. 11). Similarly, 
in Norton Health Care, Inc. 2003 NLRB LEXIS 96 (NLRB Mar. 14, 
2003), the board conducted an extensive analysis on the status of two 
clinical coordinators (charge nurses) in light of Kentucky River and still 
found them to be employees, protected by the act. 
Kentucky River influenced the outcome in several cases at the board 
outside of health care during this period, however. In two cases, the 
Court’s decision in Kentucky River caused an ALJ to issue a “supple-
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mental decision on remand” reversing an earlier decision that had found 
several people associated with a shipping company to be employees 
rather than supervisors. (Marquette Transportation/Bluegrass Marine, 
2001 NLRB LEXIS 655 (2001) and American Commercial Barge Line 
Co., 2001 NLRB LEXIS 591 [2001]). These cases were part of a larger 
group of cases, all arising from a multiemployer recognition strike by 
a pilots union. In two of these cases, the ALJ had decided that the pi-
lots were supervisors and, although Kentucky River was decided in the 
interim, the board affirmed the ALJ decision without any reliance on 
the new decision. In both Marquette and American Commercial Barge, 
a different ALJ had come to the opposite conclusion—that the pilots 
were employees (the original decisions were (Marquette Transporta-
tion/Bluegrass Marine, 1999 NLRB LEXIS 462 [1999] and American 
Commercial Barge Line Co., 1999 NLRB LEXIS 662 [1999]. After the 
Court’s decision in Kentucky River, the board remanded these cases to 
the ALJ who, after reconsidering the evidence, found the same people 
to be employees. While Kentucky River was cited in the new decisions, 
however, the ALJ actually relied more on an earlier line of cases in the 
maritime industry. The board itself, in affirming the second ALJ deci-
sion in American Commercial Barge, more clearly relies on Kentucky 
River (2002 NLRB LEXIS 355). Thus, in these cases, Kentucky River 
was clearly the stimulus for reconsideration of an earlier decision, but 
appears to have been less important in the actual substance of the new 
decisions. At the same time, the ultimate outcome was the loss of jobs 
and rights by all these pilots.
Similarly, in Majestic Star Casino, 335 NLRB No. 36 (2001), the 
regional director had determined that the mates on the employer’s riv-
erboat were employees rather than supervisors, and the employer ap-
pealed the regional director’s finding to the NLRB. In August 2001, 
the board remanded the case to the regional director, stating: “In light 
of Kentucky River, the Board has decided to remand this proceeding to 
the Regional director to reopen the record on the issue of whether the 
Employer’s mates ‘assign’ and ‘responsibly direct’ and on the scope 
and degree of ‘independent judgment’ used in the exercise of such au-
thority” (335 NLRB No. 36, at p. 9).
The large number of cases in our sample in which Kentucky River 
is merely cited on burden of proof or in which it merely results in a re-
mand for reconsideration either by the board or the ALJ may be reflect-
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Industry; employees Effect of Kentucky River (KR)
Health care cases
Beverly Health & Rehabilitation Services, 335 NLRB 
No. 54
Long-term care; LPN None
Franklin Hosp. Med. Ctr d/b/a Franklin Home 
Health, 337 NLRB No. 132
Health care; staff nurses None
Ken-Crest Services, 335 NLRB No. 63 Health care; program manager None
Lutheran Home at Moorestown, 334 NLRB No. 47 Long-term care; RN & LPN None
Maui Medical Group, Inc., 2002 NLRB LEXIS 125 Clinics; nurses None
Norton Health Care Inc., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 96 Hospital; clinical coordinator None
Nurses United for Improved Patient Health care, 
2003 NLRB LEXIS 107
Home health care agency; IV clinical 
coordinator
None. Cited on burden of proof.
St. Barnabas Hosp., 334 NLRB No.125 Hospital; doctors None
Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 2001 LEXIS 519 Hospital; charge nurse None. Cited on burden of proof.
Wilshire at Lakewood, 2002 NLRB LEXIS 301 Long-term care center; RN Probably none. Probably would 
have been supervisor prior to KR.
Non–health care cases
Adriana Distributors, Inc., 2001 LEXIS 551 Pharmaceutical distributor; general 
manager
None
Alter Barge Lines, Inc, 336 NLRB No. 132 (2001) Inland shipping; pilots None. Ingram Barge is key.
American Commercial Barge Line Co., 2001 LEXIS 
591
Inland shipping; pilots Matters. ALJ reversed decision.
Arlington Masonry Supply 2003 NLRB LEXIS 398 Building materials; maintenance 
supervisor
Matters. NLRB reversed ALJ 
decision.
Table 7.2  NLRB Cases Referring to Kentucky River before July 24, 2004
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B&A Associates, 2003 NLRB LEXIS 267 Building management; service manager None
Bay Harbour Electric, 2002 NLRB LEXIS 577 Construction; foremen None. Cited on burden of proof.
Brad Snodgrass, Inc., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 157 Construction; foremen None
Chardon Rubber Company, 335 NLRB No. 92 (2001) Rubber; production and maintenance 
workers
None. Cited on burden of proof.
Citywide Corporate Transportation, 2002 NLRB 
LEXIS 537
Limo service; driver None
Clock Electric, 2003 NLRB LEXIS 123 Construction; project manager None
David Van Os & Assocs. PC, 2002 NLRB LEXIS 16 Law firm; attorney and administrative 
staff
None
Dist. No. 1, Marine Engrs Ben. Asso., 2003 NLRB 
LEXIS 36
Shipping; licensed assistant marine 
engineers
Unclear. Possibly some. Union 
used to support case.
Dole Fresh Vegetables 2003 NLRB Lexis 395 Cannery; maintenance leads None. Cited on burden of proof
Ducommun Aerostructures, 2002 NLRB LEXIS 312 Aerospace mnfg; leadmen None
Dynamic Science, Inc., 334 NLRB No. 57 (2001) Military contractor; artillery test leaders None
E.C. Waste, Inc., 2001 LEXIS 718 Waste collection; customer service 
reps.
None. Cited on burden of proof
Ferguson Enterprises, 2002 NLRB LEXIS 504 Construction supply; foremen None
Freeman Decorating Co., 336 NLRB No.1(2001) Construction; carpenters None. Procedural cite.
Fuji Foods US, Inc., 2002 NLRB LEXIS 313 Meat processing; quality control 
assistant
None. Cited on burden of proof
GFC Crane Consultants, Inc., 2002 NLRB LEXIS 
121
Crane repair; port engineers None
Ingram Barge Co., 336 NLRB No. 131 (2001) Inland shipping; pilots None
Inter-con Security Systems, Inc., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 
329




, Eaton, and Voos
Industry; employees Effect of Kentucky River (KR)
Non–health care cases
Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 335 NLRB No. 36 (2001) Riverboat casino; mates Some. NLRB remanded to ALJ.
Marquette Trans/Bluegrass Marine, 2001 NLRB 
LEXIS 655
Inland shipping; pilots Matters. ALJ reversed decision.
New York Law Publishing Co, 336 NLRB No. 93 
(2001)
Publishing; production & editorial None
Quality Mechanical Insulation, 2003 NLRB Lexis 
367
Insulation contractor; foreman in 
warehouse
None. Cited on burden of proof.
Rhee Brothers, 2003 NLRB LEXIS 3 Food warehouse; assistant & section 
managers
None. Cited on burden of proof.
Sheet Metal Wkrs Local U 102 & 105, 2003 NLRB 
LEXIS 270
Construction; jobsite foreman None.
Williamette Industries, 336 NLRB No. 59 (2001) Manufacturing; leadmen None. Cited on burden of proof.
Table 7.2  (continued)
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ing the recentness of the decision given the length of time that it takes 
cases about supervisory status to go through the NLRB and the courts. 
More recently, in Arlington Masonry Supply, 339 NLRB No. 99 
(2003), the board overturned an ALJ decision that a “maintenance su-
pervisor” was not a supervisor under the act in a case that hinged on the 
degree of independent judgment that was involved. The board found 
that the individual in question used independent judgment because he 
assigned work—“a primary inidicia of supervisory authority” accord-
ing to the board. In overturning the ALJ, the board stated (339 NLRB 
No. 99, footnote 9 at p. 717): “In Kentucky River, supra, the Supreme 
Court rejected the rationale relied on by the hearing officer here that 
judgment involving assignment and direction of work which is based 
on technical skill and experience does not constitute ‘independent judg-
ment’ within the meaning of Sec. 2(11).” 
CHANGE IN THE NLRB’S APPROACH TO 
SUPERVISORY STATUS?
As mentioned earlier, on July 24, 2003, the NLRB invited parties 
and interested amici to file briefs addressing supervisory status issues 
in light of Kentucky River for three “lead cases,” Oakwood Healthcare, 
Beverly Enterprises–Minnesota, d/b/a Golden Crest Health Care Cen-
ter and Croft Metals. Clearly the board is reconsidering its approach 
to the question of supervisory status in light of Kentucky River, and 
nurses are especially likely to be affected; two of the three cases involve 
nurses—RNs acting in a charge nurse capacity in a hospital (Oakwood) 
and charge nurses (both RNs and LPNs) in a long-term care facility 
(Beverly Enterprises). The third case involves “leadmen” and “load su-
pervisors” in a manufacturing facility. All three cases turn on the degree 
of “independent judgment” used by the individuals in question in as-
signing work and/or directing other employees (the issue in Kentucky 
River) and all are cases in which ALJs and regional directors, applying 
the earlier criteria of the NLRB, found individuals not to be supervisors 
under the act. While the board has not yet issued its decisions in these 
three cases, it would seem fairly certain that it will attempt to apply 
similar standards to health care and other employees.
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Given that the NLRB could rule at any moment, we will discuss 
these cases only briefly. Our discussion will necessarily be specula-
tive—only time will tell what the Bush NLRB will decide is sufficient 
“independent judgment” for an individual to be considered a supervi-
sor under the act. We view the brief filed by General Counsel Arthur F. 
Rosenfeld (Rosenfeld 2003) as likely giving an indication of the direc-
tion of the board, but it is not evident that its recommendations will be 
adopted in their entirety.
Oakwood Healthcare is a case involving charge nurses at a Min-
nesota acute-care hospital. While a few charge nurses fill the position 
on a continuing basis, most are RNs who rotate into the job temporarily 
once or twice every two weeks; while they function in that capacity 
they earn an additional $1.50 per hour. The charge nurses have vari-
ous responsibilities, including meeting with a doctor if the doctor has 
an issue with a particular nurse or patient, meeting with a patient or a 
patient’s family if they have a complaint, and filling out an incident 
report if there is an error or an accident (like a fall). Most importantly, 
the charge nurse assigns staff nurses to work with individual patients. 
Much of the assignment, however, is done in accordance with detailed 
written hospital policies to equalize workloads and maintain continuity 
of care from one day to the next. The ALJ ruled and the regional direc-
tor agreed, that this level of independent judgment did not make these 
nurses supervisors—but the board’s ruling in Arlington Masonry Sup-
ply and the Rosenfeld brief indicate that NLRB may be about to change 
its standard in this area. Rosenfeld proposes, “The Section 2(11) power 
to assign with independent judgment is demonstrated by evidence that 
the alleged supervisor has discretion to assign work of differing degrees 
of difficulty or desirability on the basis of his or her own assessment of 
an employee’s ability or attitude” (Section 2a).
Beverly Enterprises involves RNs and LPNs acting as charge nurs-
es in a skilled nursing facility. As far back as 1999, a union sought an 
election in a unit of LPNs and RNs, but the employer sought to exclude 
as supervisors all 8 RNs and 11 of the 12 LPNs who served as charge 
nurses. In March 1999, the regional director issued a decision and di-
rection of election in which he included all of the disputed personnel in 
the unit, finding that they possessed no indicia of supervisory authority. 
Eventually, the cases was appealed to the 8th Circuit, which, as men-
tioned above, remanded the case to the board because it had “employed 
Supreme Court Supervisory Status Decisions  183
an improper legal standard in finding that the nurses were not statutory 
supervisors.” The board further remanded the case back to the regional 
director to examine whether the nurses in question utilized “indepen-
dent judgment” under the standard adopted by the Court in Kentucky 
River. Then, in a decision rendered in August 2002, the regional direc-
tor again found the nurses to be employees rather than supervisors. The 
bulk of his decision turned on whether or not they “exercise indepen-
dent judgment to assign and responsibly direct other employees.” In 
concluding that they did not, he relied on the fact that their judgments 
“are so circumscribed by existing policies, orders and regulations of the 
Employer that they do not exercise independent judgment within the 
meaning of Section 2(11).”
It is difficult to predict how the board will decide Beverly. In rul-
ing that the nurses were not supervisors in his most recent decision, 
the regional director took great pains to point out the minimal amount 
of independent judgment they exercise in making their decisions. For 
example, he pointed out that many of their decisions are dictated by a 
collective bargaining agreement, while others must be approved by the 
director of nursing or her assistant. On the other hand, the employer 
argued that the charge nurses can make changes in the room and floor 
assignments of the certified nursing assistants. While the regional direc-
tor found the employer had not met the burden of proof in this regard, 
the board may disagree.
Croft Metals involves “lead persons” at a facility manufacturing 
aluminum and vinyl doors and windows. One group of lead persons 
are load supervisors. Load supervisors work with three others who load 
merchandise onto trucks. In addition to counting and scanning the mer-
chandise, the load supervisor instructs the other employees on where 
and how to place the material in the truck, which is dictated largely by 
the delivery schedule. Other lead persons work in particular areas in 
the plant, like the tool room, or ensure that production lines run prop-
erly, for instance, by calling maintenance if a machine needs a repair.11 
The ALJ and regional directors found that the employer had not met its 
obligation, under Kentucky River to prove that the independent judg-
ment of these individuals is sufficient to render them supervisors. While 
we cannot be certain what the NLRB will do with this case, it seemed 
to us that the extremely low level of authority and judgment involved 
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makes it likely that that the board will uphold the earlier decisions of 
the agency.
CASES DECIDED BY THE NLRB AFTER JULY 2003
The NLRB cited Kentucky River in 36 decisions between July 24, 
2003, and November 1, 2004,12 and while NLRB may be signaling a 
change in its approach to supervisor status, as evinced by its call for 
briefs in the three cases discussed above, we do not see a significant 
change in the board’s approach as of yet. In other words, the board has 
not expanded its interpretation of who is a supervisor to date. For ex-
ample, the most recent board decision as of this writing was Wilshire at 
Lakewood, 343 NLRB No. 23, (September 30, 2004). One of the issues 
in that case was whether an RN who acted as a weekend supervisor was 
a supervisor, and in 2002, relying on Kentucky River, an ALJ had found 
that she was. In 2004, however, the board, in a 2–1 decision, reversed 
the ALJ and found her to be an employee, not a supervisor. It may be 
interesting to note, however, that the one dissenting board member was 
Chairman Battista, a Bush appointee. 
United Cerebral Palsy of New York City, Inc., 343 NLRB No. 1, is 
another health care case involving supervisory status. The procedural 
history in that case alone is worthy of note. In 2001, a regional director 
found that certain personnel were employees but on February 15, 2002, 
the respondent filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, contending 
that in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kentucky River, the 
board should find that all the individuals in the two voting groups (teach-
ers, rehabilitation specialists, developmental specialists, and pool coor-
dinators) are statutory supervisors. By unpublished order dated October 
29, 2002, the board denied both the general counsel’s and respondent’s 
motions and ordered the region to reopen the record in the case for fur-
ther consideration of whether the disputed employees are supervisors in 
light of Kentucky River. On August 6, 2003, the acting regional director 
issued a supplemental decision, again finding that the disputed employ-
ees were not supervisors. On September 2, 2003, the respondent filed a 
request for review of the supplemental decision, which the board denied 
by unpublished order dated May 28, 2004. Thus, while Kentucky River 
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led the board to reconsider the status of various employees in light of 
the Court’s decisions, and the resulting delay hurt employee’s chances 
of unionizing, the legal outcome was unchanged. In fact, in none of the 
36 cases decided between July 24, 2003, and November 1, 2004, does it 
appear that persons who might have been found to be employees prior 
to Kentucky River were found to be supervisors because of the Supreme 
Court’s decision.
FINAL OBSERVATIONS
The U.S. courts have, over time, reduced the number of persons 
who are deemed to have rights under the NLRA by gradually expanding 
the supervisory exclusion, and by making it applicable to those profes-
sional employees who direct the work of less-skilled employees. The 
decision of the Supreme Court in Kentucky River initially struck us as 
being potentially very damaging to nurses who were attempting to orga-
nize. Arguments about the actual degree of independent judgment used 
by nurses (many of whom operate in a work environment characterized 
by detailed written employer standards for care), however, have been 
persuasive to numerous ALJs and regional directors of NLRB. To date, 
Kentucky River, has not caused a sea-change in NLRB rulings regard-
ing the status of nurses as employees under the law. Rather, it appears 
to be one more case in a long line of cases that gradually have eroded 
the rights of certain individuals to choose whether or not they wish to 
be represented by a labor organization. 
The case has been important in adding to delays in numerous rep-
resentation cases—delays that decidedly harm employees who want 
union representation. Unions are finding tactics to counteract employ-
ers’ use of the law to delay and to block collective bargaining for nurses 
and other health care professionals, but the problem persists. Unions in 
health care, like unions elsewhere, are trying to pressure employers to 
both enforce and expand rights under the NLRA through the negotia-
tion of neutrality and card check agreements.
Things are likely to get more problematic in the next few months, 
with a more conservative NLRB and with a judiciary that is quite will-
ing to find tugboat pilots and other relatively low-level employees to 
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be without the right to organize simply because they direct the work 
of other employees and in so doing exercise a degree of independent 
judgment. While it is unclear how the NLRB will rule in each of the 
three “lead cases” discussed in this chapter, it is clear that the board will 
apply the same standard in health care as it has in other industries, most 
likely to the detriment of some nurses. 
Ultimately, labor law needs to be changed in a number of respects; 
one particularly problematic aspect of the law that is ripe for reconsid-
eration is its narrow coverage. It is not clear why the right to organize 
on the part of nurses, tugboat pilots, and electrical transmission employ-
ees should even be subject to hair-splitting legal contention. Kentucky 
River made it harder for such employees to organize, but as yet has not 
made a major change in the existing legal situation. It may provide the 
excuse for a major change in policy on the part of the Bush-appointee- 
dominated NLRB.
Notes
 1.  In 2003, 18.1 percent of all professionals were union members, in contrast to 
12.9 percent of all wage and salary workers. Recently there has been a marked 
increase in interest in unionization among pharmacists (McHugh and Bodah 
2002) and physicians (9 percent of pharmacists and 5 percent of physicians are 
now members). See Hirsch and MacPherson (1996, 2001) for detailed occupa-
tion unionization rates based on the Current Population Survey), or the Web site 
maintained by them at http://www.unionstats.com/. Data here were obtained 
from that site on November 18, 2004.
 2.  Particularly important decisions include NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Tex-
tron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) and NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 
(1979). 
 3.  Section 2(12) provides, that “The term ‘professional employee’ means (a) any 
employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character 
as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involv-
ing the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of 
such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be 
standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of 
an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a pro-
longed course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of 
higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education 
or from an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, 
manual, or physical processes; or (b) any employee, who (i) has completed the 
courses of specialized intellectual instruction and study described in clause (iv) 
of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing related work under the supervision of 
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a professional person to qualify himself to become a professional employee as 
defined in paragraph (a).
 4.  Section 2(11) of the act states, “The term ‘supervisor’ means any individual 
having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay 
off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, 
or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to rec-
ommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such 
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of 
independent judgment.” 
 5.  Interviews were conducted by a University of Illinois graduate student, Lisa 
Roan, who is a registered nurse, as part of an independent study on her part. We 
thank her for her persistence and dedication in exploring these issues with union 
staff.
 6.  Beth Kean, Director of Organizing, California Nurses Association; telephone in-
terview. L. Roan, June 19, 2002.
 7.  Mike Slott, Education Director, HPAE/AFT, New Jersey; conversation. P. Voos, 
August 2, 2002.
 8.  See previous note.
 9.  Of course, we cannot say with certainty that the bargaining order in either of 
these cases would have been enforced in the absence of Kentucky River.
10.  Two authors read each case and made an assessment of whether or not Kentucky 
River made a difference in the outcome of the case; if the two readers disagreed 
(an unusual outcome), then the third author read the case and we talked in order 
to come to a consensus on our understanding of the impact of Kentucky River. 
11.  In earlier years, a different labor organization than the one petitioning for repre-
sentation represented some employees at this same manufacturing facility. Lead-
men were included with other plant employees in one bargaining unit at that 
time.
12.  Mays Elec. Co., 343 NLRB No. 20 (Sept. 30, 2004); Duer Constr. Co., 2004 
NLRB LEXIS 594 (NLRB Sept. 30, 2004); Valley Slurry Seal Co. And Constr. 
And General Laborers’ Local 185, 343 NLRB No. 34 (Sept. 30, 2004); Wilshire 
at Lakewood, 343 NLRB No. 23 (Sept. 30, 2004); United Cerebral Palsy of 
N.Y. City, Inc., 343 NLRB No. 1 (Sept. 28, 2004); K. W. Elec., Inc., 342 NLRB 
No. 126 (Sept. 24, 2004); John T. Jones Constr. Co., 2004 NLRB LEXIS 536 
(NLRB Sept. 24, 2004); Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 NLRB No. 101 
(Sept. 10, 2004);Wackenhut Corp., 2004 NLRB LEXIS 493 (NLRB Sept. 7, 
2004); Deffenbaugh Disposal Servs., 2004 NLRB LEXIS 443 (NLRB July 30, 
2004); Taylor, 2004 NLRB LEXIS 387 (NLRB July 13, 2004); Sara Lee Bakery 
Group, 342 NLRB No. 12 (June 25, 2004); Kelly Bros. Sheet Metal, Inc., 342 
NLRB No. 9 (June 21, 2004); Donaldson Bros. Ready Mix, Inc., 341 NLRB 
No. 124 (May 19, 2004); K. W. Elec., 2004 NLRB LEXIS 252 (NLRB May 
18, 2004); Volair Contrs., Inc., 341 NLRB No. 98 (Apr. 30, 2004); Serv. Spring 
Corp., 2004 NLRB LEXIS 196 (NLRB Apr. 29, 2004); Trane, an Operating Div. 
of Am. Std., Emplr., 2004 NLRB LEXIS 124 (NLRB Mar. 19, 2004); Mays 
Elec. Co., 2004 NLRB LEXIS 73 (NLRB Feb. 20, 2004); Solvay Iron Works, 
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Inc., 341 NLRB No. 25 (Feb. 17, 2004); Safe Disposal Sys., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 
814 (NLRB Dec. 29, 2003); Allied Mech., Inc., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 810 (NLRB 
Dec. 19, 2003); Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local Unions 102 & 105, 340 
NLRB No. 149 (Dec. 11, 2003); Sara Lee Bakery Group, 2003 NLRB LEXIS 
776 (NLRB Dec. 2, 2003); L.A. Water & Power Emples. Ass’n, 340 NLRB No. 
146 (Nov. 28, 2003); Flat Dog Prods., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 743 (NLRB Nov. 24, 
2003); Jewish Home for the Elderly of Fairfield County, 2003 NLRB LEXIS 
745 (NLRB Nov. 21, 2003); Quality Mech. Insulation, Inc., 340 NLRB No. 91; 
Int’l Transp. Serv. (ITS), 2003 NLRB LEXIS 604 (NLRB Sept. 10, 2003); Kelly 
Bros. Sheet Metal, Inc., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 527 (NLRB Sept. 3, 2003); Barstow 
Cmty. Hosp., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 536 (NLRB Aug. 29, 2003); Univar USA, 
Inc., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 528 (NLRB Aug. 28, 2003); Solvay Iron Works, Inc., 
2003 NLRB LEXIS 471 (NLRB Aug. 20, 2003); Lenawee Long Term Care, 
Inc., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 459 (NLRB Aug. 14, 2003); Arlington Masonry Sup-
ply, Inc., 339 NLRB No. 99 (July 21, 2003); Dole Fresh Vegetables, Inc., 2003 
NLRB LEXIS 395, 339 NLRB No. 90 (July 17, 2003); Quality Mech. Insulation, 
Inc., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 367 (NLRB July 7, 2003); Inter-Con Sec. Sys., 2003 
NLRB LEXIS 329 (NLRB June 23, 2003).
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